The continually rising demand for wireless services and applications in the era of Internet of things (IoT) and artificial intelligence (AI) presents a significant number of unprecedented challenges to existing network structures. To meet the rapid growth need of mobile data services, blockchain radio access network (B-RAN) has emerged as a decentralized, trustworthy radio access paradigm spurred by blockchain technologies. However, many characteristics of B-RAN remain unclear and hard to characterize. In this study, we develop an analytical framework to model B-RAN and provide some basic fundamental analysis. Starting from block generation, we establish a queuing model based on a time-homogeneous Markov chain. From the queuing model, we evaluate the performance of B-RAN with respect to latency and security considerations. By connecting latency and security, we uncover a more comprehensive picture of the achievable performance of B-RAN. Further, we present experimental results via an innovative prototype and validate the proposed model.
I. INTRODUCTION
The past decade has witnessed tremendous growth in emerging wireless technologies geared toward diverse applications [1] . Radio access networks (RANs) are becoming more heterogeneous and highly complex. Without well-designed inter-operation, mobile network operators (MNOs) must rely on their independent infrastructures and spectra to deliver data, often leading to duplication, redundancy, and inefficiency. A huge number of currently deployed business or individual access points (APs) have not been coordinated in the existing architecture of RANs, and are therefore under-utilized. Meanwhile, user equipments (UEs) are not granted to access to APs of operators other than their own, even though some Table I IMPORTANT VARIABLES [19] . Unfortunately, the length of such delay and its controllability are still open issues. 3) Security is yet another critical aspect of blockchain-based protocols. In particular, alternative history attack, as an inherent risk of decentralized databases, is always possible, and must be assessed. 4) A proper model is urgently needed to exploit the characteristics of B-RAN (such as latency and security) and to further provide insights and guidelines for real-world implementations.
To address the aforementioned open issues, this study aims to establish a framework to concretely model and evaluate B-RAN. We start from the block generation process and develop an analytical model to characterize B-RAN behaviors. We shall evaluate the performance in terms of latency and security in order to present a more comprehensive view of B-RAN. We will verify the efficacy of our model by building an innovative B-RAN prototype. We summarize our key contributions as follows:
• We clearly define the workflow of B-RAN and develop an original queuing model based on a timehomogeneous Markov chain. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first known analytical model for B-RAN.
• From the queuing model, we analytically characterize the system latency of B-RAN and further derive both upper and lower bounds on B-RAN latency.
• We use the probability of successful attack to define the security level of B-RAN and evaluate potential factors that influence the security. We further assess the risk by taking the attacker's strategy into consideration.
• Based on the modeling and analysis, we uncover an inherent trade-off relationship between security and latency, and develop an in-depth understanding regarding the achievable performance of B-RAN.
• Finally, we build a B-RAN prototype that can be used comprehensive experiments to validate the accuracy of our analytical model and results.
We organize this manuscript as follows. Section II presents the B-RAN framework and the prototype. Section III provides the mining model to describe the block generation process. In Section IV, we establish the B-RAN queuing model, with which we analyze and evaluate the B-RAN performance concerning latency and security in Section V and Section VI, respectively. We demonstrate the latency-security tradeoff in Section VII and provide some in-depth insights to B-RAN. Section VIII concludes our manuscript.
Given the large number of symbols to be used, we summarize the important variables in Table I .
II. B-RAN FRAMEWORK
B-RAN can integrate multiple networks across SPs for diverse applications. As illustrated in Fig. 1 , B-RAN is self-organized by APs belonging to multiple SPs, massive UEs, and a blockchain maintained by miners. In B-RAN, there is a confederacy of SPs (organizations or individuals) that are willing to provide public wireless access under shared control. These SPs in B-RAN allow the greater pool of UEs to access their APs and networks by receiving payment or credit for reciprocal services. Blockchain, as the name suggests, is a chain of interconnected blocks [22] , which acts as a public ledger in B-RAN for recording, confirming, and enforcing digital actions in smart contracts.
Traditional roaming in cellular networks may be viewed as a legacy solution that has poor cost structure.
There has been little incentive for cellular RAN operators to coordinate services and coverages. It is so challenging to reach mutual agreement on roaming between hundreds of organizational SPs without relying on a trusted third party, not to include unknown individual SPs. During roaming, UEs are also required to select an AP from its subscribed operator, even though it may not deliver services of the most bandwidth-efficient and highest quality in a given environment. With the help of blockchain, B-RAN can form an expansive cooperative network of different operators to deliver high quality service at high spectrum efficiency while protecting the interests of all legal participants at the same time.
A. Access Workflow
Since B-RAN is envisioned to be broadly inter-operative and to support multiple advanced wireless services and standards. This work focuses on the most basic access approach for which the procedure is shown in Fig. 2 .
• In preparation for access, UEs and SPs should first enter an SLA containing the details including service types, compensation rates, among other terms. (For example, SPs can first publish their service quality and charge standard, and UEs select suitable SPs according to the expenditure and quality of service.) The service terms and fees will be explicitly recorded in a smart contract authorized by the digital signatures of both sides.
• In step 1, the smart contract with the access request is committed to the mining network and is then verified by miners.
• In step 2, the verified contracts are assembled into a new block, which is then added at the end of the chain.
• In step 3, the block is accepted into the main chain after sufficient blocks as confirmations built on top of it.
• In step 4, the access service is delivered according to the signed smart contract.
Clients can obtain access services more conveniently through the above process instead of signing contracts with a specific MNO in advance. The service duration in B-RAN is flexible and can be as short as a few minutes or hours, which is different from typical long-term plans (e.g., monthly plans). Hence, in B-RAN, mobile devices can access suitable APs belonging to various SPs which likely provide higher quality coverage for the UEs in their current locations. UEs can prolong access services by renewing the contract earlier before the previous one expires in order to continue the connection status. Hence, service latency in this context refers to the delay when a UE accesses an unknown network for the first time, rather than the delay in the physical layer transmission.
Mathematically, we can describe the request structure by REQ k (t a k , τ c k ) shown in Fig. 2 , where t a k and τ c k are the arrival epoch and the service duration of request k, respectively. Assume that the access requests are mutually independent, and arrive as a Poisson process with rate λ a . Equivalently, the interarrival time between two requests U a follows exponential distribution with mean T a = 1/λ a . Based on well-known studies such as [23] , the random service time τ c k is also expected to be exponential with mean T c = 1/λ c . Note that in this work, we consider a tract covered by multiple trustless SPs (organizations or individuals). The APs belonging to these SPs in the tract are capable of providing access services for at most s UEs. In other words, s can be viewed as the maximum number of access links in the considered tract. The block size limit is considered as unlimited when we focus on one tract.
B. Consensus Mechanism
B-RAN, as a decentralized system, requires proper consensus mechanisms for consistency [16] , [24] .
Proof-of-Work (PoW) has been widely used in practice and proven to be secure in cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin. In PoW, network maintainers, also known as miners, need to obtain a hash value below a given target by repeatedly guessing a random variable named nonce. However, PoW-based consensus mechanisms consume a tremendous amount of energy, which is likely unbearable for energy-limited mobile devices. Consequently, Proof-of-Device (PoD) is proposed for B-RAN as a promising alternative by utilizing the fact that wireless access usually depends on a hardware device associated with a unique identifier (ID) [5] . PoD deploys unique tamper-proof IDs, such as the international mobile equipment identity (IMEI) and Identifier for Advertisers (IFA), in order to distinguish different network entities. Also, due to variations during manufacture, every device has multiple hardware-dependent features, which could constitute a unique RF fingerprinting for each device and can be identified from the transmitted RF signal [25] . In the real world, forging an identity of a device is often costly, whereas creating multiple identities is almost costless in cryptocurrencies. Therefore, PoD can safeguard the security of B-RAN without expending immense computing power and is thus suitable for wireless networks. Notably, PoW, PoD, and other alternatives can be put in the same class since all of them are based on hash puzzles. We will further discuss and model the block generation process of a hash-based consensus mechanism in Section III.
C. Implementation
In order to evaluate our established model, we will provide demonstrative experimental results from a home-built prototype throughout the whole article. We implement this version of B-RAN prototype on a workstation with Intel Core CPU I7-8700K and 32GB RAM. Our prototype consists of a standard file system for data storage, a key-value database for file index, and several core modules written in Python. The prototype supports both PoW and PoD consensus mechanisms and adopts the fast smart contract deployment (FSCD) [21] . We configure different Ethernet ports as UEs and APs and set up the integrated development environment (IDE), wherein UEs propose random access requests according to the input configurations and APs provide services based on the workflow given in Section II-A. During tests, the prototype can track running statistics and provide them as output results. More details about the implementation, e.g., the concepts of root contract and contract cache, can be found in [21] . Note that, in this work, the average service time T c as time unit is set to unity without loss of generality, so time is measured as relative variables in terms of time unit T c .
III. MINING MODEL

A. Hash-Based Mining
In this section, we will present a general model for hash-based puzzles to describe the block generation process, also known as mining. Usually, block propagation in networks is much faster than block generation, and we thus ignore the block spreading delay. We will verify the mining model by using the real data of Bitcoin and Ethereum.
Generally, a hash puzzle is to find a suitable answer to satisfy the following conditions:
Here "HP" stands for the hash pointer to a previous block, "DP" means the data payload, "TS" is the current timestamp, "GT" represents a given target, and "OF" is the optional field depending on the specific type of the hash puzzle. For instance, in the PoW protocol, the optional field can be any random number, whereas, in the PoD protocol, the optional field is given by the hardware ID. In PoW, the range of the optional field is unlimited. Hence, a miner can guess many times to find a correct nonce, and hence the number of trials is only restricted by the mining rigs. In PoD, the optional field is given by the tamper-proof ID such that each device can perform the hash computation only once for each slot, thereby largely reducing the power consumption. The premise behind that is the entities in real RANs cannot be effortlessly forged or created. The characteristics, e.g., security level and power consumption, of different hash-based consensus mechanism can be traded off by properly choosing the optional field. Continuous time preceding the first success
Mean number of successes per unit time (success rate)
Average block time B(n, t, t + h) Event that n blocks occur in the interval (t, t + h) β Relative mining rate of an attacker
B. Modeling of Hash Trials
For a general hash-based mining process, each hash trial can be regarded as an independent Bernoulli experiment with success probability p as the timestamp keeps changing. In a sequence of independent Bernoulli trials, the probability that the first block is generated after exactly m failures is
Let W b be the number of failures preceding the first success. Then, W b follows geometric distribution:
Also, the probability that the number of trials preceding the first success is at least m equals
Here, W b can be viewed as the waiting period before a block is successfully generated, and its distribution can be described by (2) and (3) . The average number of successes in m independent trials is mp.
Hence, if m hash trials are conducted in a time interval of length τ , then the success rate defined as the mean number of successes per unit time is λ b = mp/τ . Now let p → 0 and m → ∞ in the way that keeps λ b constant. We can visualize an experiment with infinite hash trials performed within interval τ . Successive trials are infinitesimally close with vanishingly small probability of success, but the mean number of successes remains a non-zero constant λ b τ . By using the fact that the geometric distribution approaches the exponential distribution in the limit, we have
Define a random variable U b as the continuous time before preceding the first success.
U b is also named as the block time in the context of blockchain. The average block time, denoted by T b , is equal to 1/λ b according to (5) . λ b is thus called as the mining rate representing the block generation rate. Now we further prove that blocks generate form a Poisson process. Let B(n, t, t + h) denote the event that n blocks are generated in interval (t, t + h). As h → 0, the probability that at least one block will is generated in
We note that o(h) is an infinitesimal of higher order such that lim h→0 o(h)/h = 0. The probability that exactly one block will occur in (t, t + h) is
where U b 1 and U b 2 represent the generation times of first and second blocks since the epoch t. As h → 0, the probability of occurrence of two or more blocks in
In conclusion, the block generation can be modeled as a Poisson process with mining rate λ b . The notations in this section are summarized in Table II. In Prototype Verification A, we illustrate the model validity of Poisson in Fig. 3 by empirical data. In our self-built B-RAN prototype described in Fig. 3 (a), we deploy five miners with equal mining rates and 
C. Attacker's Model
In this part, we consider an adversary who mounts an alternative history attack by attempting to generate a longer fraudulent block chain. The adversarial has to generate new blocks in the same way as honest miners since the hash value can hardly be tampered. Hence, the fraudulent blocks are also generated as
Poisson. Now assume that the mining rate of the attacker is βλ b , while the mining rate of honest miners is λ b , i.e., the attacker controls β 1+β fraction of hash power 4 . Both the attacker and the benign network are mining independently. From the additive property of Poisson processes, the sum generation rate of both benign and fraudulent block is (β + 1) λ b . Note that, in an alternative history attack, the attacker will not publish the fraudulent chain until it creates a more extended branch. Consequently, the benign participants of B-RAN are unaware of the existence of the attacker, and can only observe the blocks generated by honest miners with the generation rate λ b until a fraud succeeds. We will provide a detailed procedure of the alternative history attack in Section VII.
IV. B-RAN QUEUING MODEL
According to the B-RAN framework in Section II, we divide the service process of a valid request into four stages: 1) waiting to be included into a block; 2) waiting for confirmations; 3) waiting for service; 4) in service. Naturally, we can model the process using several queues in tandem based on the four phases. However, it is worth pointing out that, in the third stage, the requests in the same block arrive simultaneously, and the number of requests is related to the block generation time U b . Hence, this queue is non-Markovian since some previous events (e.g., U b ) beside the current state of the queue may affect its future state. Usually, a non-Markovian queue is difficult to tackle. Therefore, we should carefully select the state space of B-RAN for further analysis.
Let i n be the number of pending requests that already have n confirmations. A pending request is con- tuples of non-negative integers. Formally, the queuing process of B-RAN can be completely described by a vector stochastic process as follows:
. Note that the way to establish a queuing model is not unique. We define B-RAN by using the queuing model {X(t), t ≥ 0} owing to two critical properties, as shown in Theorem 1.
Theorem 1. The queuing model {X(t), t ≥ 0} is a continuous time-homogeneous Markov process with
properties:
2) Time homogeneity:
Proof. Recall that, as claimed in Section II, requests arrival according to a Poisson process with rate λ a , and the service times are exponentially distributed with mean 1/λ c , independently of each other.
According to the mining model in Section III, the block generation is a Poisson process with rate λ b .
In a nutshell, request inter-arrival times U a , block times U b , and service times U c are exponential with mean 1/λ a , 1/λ b , and 1/λ c , respectively, and independent of each other.
The exponential service times U c imply that if there are j UEs in service, the rate at which service completions occur is jλ c . To show this, suppose that U 
Only those UEs that are in service can possibly leave. Hence, the service completion rate with j simultaneous services is jλ c for 0 ≤ j ≤ s. Since at most s UEs can be in service simultaneously, obviously the service completion rate is at most sλ c . Hence, we denote
to represent the service completion rate of B-RAN compactly.
Similarly, the time until the next event (an request arrival, a block generation, or a service completion)
is also exponentially distributed with rate (λ a + λ b + λ c j ). The probability that an event occurs in
The length of time required for the event to occur and the type of the event are independent. There are several possible changes to a state. If a new request arrives, the state of B-RAN will switch from E ′ (i 0 , i 1 , ..., i N −1 , j)
to E (i 0 + 1, i 1 , ..., i N −1 , j). The probability that a new request arrives in (t, t + h) is
If a new block is generated, all existing blocks will get one more confirmation, and the state of B-
. The probability that a block is generated in (t, t + h) can be found to satisfy
If an access service is ended (j ≥ 1 at this instant), the state of B-RAN will switch from
. The probability that a service completion occurs in (t, t + h) is
The probability that no event occurs in (t, t + h) is given by
The probability that more than one event occurs in
Now we have obtained the transition probabilities Pr{X(t + h) = E|X(t) = E ′ } for any possible E and E ′ in the state space. Observe that the transition probabilities are irrelevant to the starting time t, which indicates that {X(t), t ≥ 0} is homogeneous in time. Moreover, the transition probabilities are independent of the states of previous moments, which implies the Markov property. Therefore, we have proven that {X(t), t ≥ 0} is a time-homogeneous Markov process.
Although the queuing model established by Theorem 1 is a vector stochastic process with possibly high dimensions, we would like to emphasize that such a queuing model is more tractable than the original non-Markovian process. According to Theorem 1, we can directly obtain the transition probabilities,
given by Corollary 1.
Corollary 1. The queuing model {X(t), t ≥ 0} can be characterized by the transition probabilities
The cases with non-zero transition probabilities are covered by (7)- (10), and probabilities of the rest equal zeros. In the following sections, we will look at B-RAN and analyze it from a deeper view in more dimensions. 
V. LATENCY ANALYSIS OF B-RAN
A. Steady-State Analysis
Now we have thus far modeled the B-RAN as a time-homogeneous Markov process with (N + 1) dimensions. However, the dimensionality of the state space results in a complex probability transition graph and is difficult to analyze in general. In the section, we will analyze access service latency of B-RAN by starting from a relatively simple one-confirmation case (i.e., only one confirmation is required to confirm a request). In other words, a request is confirmed, as long as it is assembled into a block. In the oneconfirmation case, the queuing model is presented by {X(t) = E(i 0 , j), t ≥ 0}. We drop the subscript of i 0 for notational simplicity. State E(i, j) means that i pending requests are waiting for assembling into a block and j confirmed requests are waiting for service. Define w i,j (t) = Pr {X(t) = E(i, j)} as the probability of the queue in state E(i, j) at time t. Now let us investigate the transition probabilities during time h with the help of Corollary 1. By comparing the state of B-RAN at time t + h with that at time t, for all i = 1, 2, ... and j = 0, 1, 2, ..., we have
where λ c j is defined by (6) . By letting h → 0, we get the following differential-difference equation:
Let {w i,j } be the steady-state distribution of B-RAN. The equilibrium condition d dt w i,j (t) = 0 yields
For the boundary cases (i = 0), we have
The differential-difference equations (11)- (13) are known as the forward Kolmogorov equations [26] . We illustrate the state transition relationships with one confirmation in Fig. 5 .
In order to present the forward Kolmogorov equations in a compact form, we rearrange the twodimension states {w i,j } by a particular order as shown in Fig. 6 , captured by the probability vector:
Now the forward Kolmogorov equations can be rewritten in a matrix form:
where Q is known as the infinitesimal generator, or transition rate matrix:
The entry in Q equals to the corresponding transition rate given by 
From (16), the steady-state distribution w(Φ) can be expressed as an implicit function of Φ. Note that the waiting space of B-RAN has no maximum limit. The number of states, i.e., the dimensions of the vector w, should be infinite. In numerical calculations, we can use the solution with large enough but finite dimensions to approximate the infinite-dimension one. However, in practice the number of UEs in a tract cannot be infinite, either. The aggressive load λ a is required to be less than λ c by the stable condition.
We can obtain the steady-state distribution of B-RAN via (16) . Meanwhile, we use our self-built To analyze the average latency in B-RAN, we consider the limiting distribution w(Φ), from which we can obtain the average number of waiting requests N (Φ) in B-RAN:
We can apply the Little's Law [23] as a bridge to connect the expected queue length and the average latency. The Little's Law states that, in a stable system, the average number of items is equal to the arrival rate multiplied by the average time an item spends in the system. Hence, the expected sojourn time L s (N, Φ) is the sum of waiting time and service time (all the four stages of the workflow), and the expression of expected sojourn time in the one-confirmation case is given by:
According to Section II, the expected service time is T c . Thus, the average latency L (N, Φ) is defined as the expected waiting time (the first three stages). In the one-confirmation case, L (N, Φ) can be written
(19) gives the average latency with one confirmation in terms of the limiting distribution in (14) .
However, (19) only applies the one-confirmation special case. Our goal is to investigate the general N -confirmation problem.
It is difficult to directly analyze a queue with (N + 1)-dimensional state space, mainly due to the excessively large number variables in solving the equilibrium equations (14) . Recall that we are more interested in the average system latency. A request, once assembled into a block, is required to wait for N − 1 confirmations after the very first confirmation of assembling into a block.
This waiting period is an additional stage compared to the one-confirmation case. The additional N − 1 confirmations correspond to extra waiting time of N − 1 independent block time U b n . Hence, the average access latency is given by latency is linear in T b , because T b will influence the limiting distribution w i,j (Φ), which in turn also affects latency. For large N , however, we can conclude that latency is quasi-linear in T b .
In Prototype Verification B, we compare the analytical results of (20) 
B. Bounds on Latency
Although we have an accurate queuing model {X(t), t ≥ 0} for B-RAN, the relationship between latency in (20) and B-RAN parameters Φ remains unspecified. Here we reveal the impact of key parameters on the B-RAN latency by deriving tight bounds.
We first investigate the upper bound of latency by introducing an extra constraint that each block can carry at most one request. The ultra-small block size constraint largely affects network throughput but can effectively simplify the queuing process. For the one-confirmation case, requests are separately organized into different blocks. Requests and blocks arrive as a Poisson Process with rate λ a and λ b , respectively.
Hence, the assembling process becomes an M/M/1 queue with arrival rate λ a and service rate λ b . After being assembled into blocks, requests get confirmed and wait for service, effectively forming an M/M/s queue. Hence, by introduced the block size limit, the whole process is divided into two queues in tandem and can be analyzed separately.
Given arrival rate λ and service rate µ, the average waiting time of an M/M/1 queue is 1 µ−λ [23] . However, the latency of an M/M/s queue is relatively complex, captured by a known lemma in Chapter 
In the N -confirmation case, we should take the additional confirmation latency N −1 λ b into account. The overall latency experienced by a request aggregates the four stages shown in Fig. 2 . Consequently, under the block size limit, the system latency is upper bounded by
In practice, the block size limit is always much greater than one, and apparently, the obtained bound
Otherwise, the length of the first stage (i.e., the M/M/1 queue) will grow without limits and L ub (N, Φ)
would tend to infinity.
To derive the lower bound of latency, consider that blocks are rapidly generated such that a request is assembled into a block immediately upon its arrival. As a result, the queuing process with one confirmation is directly reduced to only an M/M/s queue. By considering confirmation latency, we obtain an lower bound of service latency:
The gap between L lb1 (N, Φ) and L ub (N, Φ) equals
Therefore, in this case of λ b ≫ λ a or more accurately λ b − λ a → ∞, we can say both L lb1 (N, Φ) and L ub (N, Φ) are quite tight in terms of latency.
Moreover, we can obtain another lower bound by estimating how long it takes to assemble a request into a block. As shown in Section V-A, the closed-form distribution of E (i, j) is intractable. However, it is possible to deal with the distribution of i in state E (i, j). We can sketch the state space diagram of the number of pending requests i, and then it forms a typical M/M/∞ queue with arrival rate λ a and service rate λ b . By formulating the forward Kolmogorov equations, we can obtain the limiting distribution as
According to the Little's Law, the mean waiting time for assembling is 1/λ b . By simply neglecting the waiting time for service (Phase 3), we can attain another lower bound of latency:
Since the waiting time for service (phase 3) to devise L lb2 (N, Φ) is neglected, the second lower bound can be regarded as an extreme case under an ultra-light traffic intensity. This is the case when the request arrival rate λ a is extremely small such that there always exist idle access links, in which case the confirmed requests no longer have to wait for service. Thus, L lb2 (N, Φ) becomes tight as λ a → 0. Observe that the arrival rate λ a does not appear in the expression of L lb2 (N, Φ), indicating that L lb2 (N, Φ) is a unified bound for different arrival rates and could be a bit loose in some cases.
In Prototype Verification C, we would like to evaluate the accuracy of the queuing model and the bounds through experimental results. We set the maximum number of access links to s = 25 and obtain average and 95% confidence interval of service latency for different system setups Φ, as shown in Fig. 10 .
From the results in Fig. 10 , we see that the queuing model established in our work accurately predicted the experimental results. When the traffic intensity is less than 1 2 , the average latency is dominated by the confirmation delay (N T b ). When the traffic intensity becomes larger, the network congest occurs and leads to a much longer delay. We also provided the upper and lower bounds in Fig. 10 . It is clear that both upper and lower bounds can help estimate the range of latency. At low traffic intensity, the average service latency is close to the lower bound L lb2 (N, Φ) , where the service latency is dominated by the confirmation delay, as discussed in Section V-B. From Fig. 10(b) , since λ b is much larger than λ a , we can see that L ub (N, Φ) and L lb1 (N, Φ) become much tighter. 
VI. SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS
A. Alternative History Attack
Since B-RAN is a distributed radio access network enabled by blockchains, which do elicit certain security concerns and risks. There can be a variety of vulnerabilities and security implications in blockchain systems. The alternative history attack, also referred to as "double spending attack", is a fundamental and inherent risk of distributed systems [2] , [27] .
The alternative history attack implies that the history record in blockchain could be tampered by malicious miners, which essentially exposes the vulnerability of blockchain. In alternative history attack, an attacker privately mines an alternative blockchain fork in which a fraudulent double spending event (e.g., an access service in B-RAN) is included. After the network accepts a benign chain, the attacker releases the fraudulent fork. If the fraudulent fork eventually becomes longer than the benign one, the attacker can successfully alter a confirmed history and spend the same coin (credit) twice, which would drive the blockchain system into a catastrophic inconsistent state. For wireless network, altering a confirmed chain in B-RAN may lead to interference issues when more than one UEs attempt to access the same channel simultaneously. Hence, alternative history attack cannot be simply ignored, despite the difference transactions between B-RAN and cryptocurrencies. In our security considerations, we focus mainly on the risk of alternative history attacks.
For blockchain to overcome alternative history attack, miners are always guided to the "longest"
locally known fork, that is, the one involving the highest amount of computational effort so far. The block generation process is coupled to some specific capability of miners, e.g., computational power in PoW and the number of available devices in PoD. Still, alternative history attacks are possible, and only require adversaries to create a chain longer than the benign one. Clearly, the higher the number of confirmations, the lower the probability of a successful alternative history attack.
B. Probability of Successful Attack
Recall that the benign miners' and an attacker's mining rate are λ b and βλ b , respectively, as β represents the attacker's relative hash power. Rational benign miners always work on the longest chain for the mining rewards, while the attacker attempts to generate a fraudulent fork to revise the history for double spending or other purposes. Before initiating a fraud, the attacker will broadcast a regular event (e.g., paying for access) and wait for it to be assembled into a block. That block is the recorded history which the attacker attempts to revise. As shown in Fig. 11 , the attacker will mount an alternative history attack according to the following steps:
1) secretly mine on a fork excluding the attacked block;
2) wait until the attacked block receives enough confirmations (say, N blocks);
3) broadcast the respective blocks as soon as the fraudulent fork is longer than the benign fork.
Note that the attacker could always mine on the fraudulent chain, despiting being many blocks behind.
In practice, the attacker usually will stop working on the fraudulent chain and give up if it is, e.g., N g blocks, behind.
Given the attacker's relative mining rate β and its strategy N g , we would like to determine the probability of a successful alternative history attack, donated by S {N, β, N g }, to reflect how secure B-RAN is.
Theorem 2. Given the attacker's relative mining rate β and the give-up strategy N g , the probability of a successful alternative history attack is
Proof. Please see Appendix A.
A more powerful attacker with a larger β is more likely to revise history successfully, while more confirmations can effectively mitigate the risk of such malicious attacks. However, no matter how large N is, the alternative history attack is always possible if the attacker has a non-negative mining rate and sufficient luck. We note that the attacker's give-up parameter N g has never been characterized in the existing studies, which, in fact, cannot be simply ignored. Based on Theorem 2, we further consider the impact of N g on the success probability.
Corollary 2. Given N and β, the probability of a successful attack S (N, β, N g ) increases monotonically
with N g . Hence, the maximum success probability is S (N, β) = lim Ng→∞ S (N, β, N g ), given by
Proof. Please see Appendix B.
Corollary 2 intuitively indicates that the attacker can increase the success probability through repeated trials. Hence, S (N, β) is the maximum probability of an alternative history attack. The dominant strategy of a powerful attacker with β ≥ 1 is to never quit. Because S (N, β) = 1 for β > 1, the fraud would succeed eventually. This is known as the "51%" attack or Goldfinger attack [2] . For weaker hash power β < 1, although a larger N g can also increase the success probability, it costs a vast number of resources and could possibly lead to negative yields. If the fraudulent chain is hundreds of blocks behind the benign chain, a rational attacker should give up and mount a new round of attack instead of sticking to the original one with mounting cost.
We would like to point out why our result differs from the existing studies. The original Bitcoin paper [22] claimed that Y follows a Poisson distribution, which is actually inaccurate. In [2] , authors counted the breakeven case in computing the probability of successful attack. Authors of [2] , [28] assumed that the attacker can pre-mine a block before mount an attack. Clearly, the existing works relied on less realistic assumptions. Our results further reveal the impact of the attacker's strategy (N g ), and therefore is more practical compared to the existing studies. In Prototype Verification D, we now show the security performance of B-RAN obtained from our home-built prototype. From Fig. 12 , one can see clearly that the experiment results firmly agree with our analytical probability of Theorem 2. As the relative mining rate β increases, the probability of a successful attack rises significantly. The chain is more secure if it is safeguarded by more confirmations, which suggests that the number of confirmations N can effectively reduce the risk.
In Fig. 13 , we illustrate that the attacker's threshold N g can also affect the success probability, especially for β close to 1. An attacker can increase the success probability by continued attempts, which, although, expends more mining energy. For β > 1, the 51% attack would eventually succeed, and thus the dominant strategy for a powerful attacker should be to use N g = ∞. According to Fig. 13 ,
serves as an upper bound of the success probability, which corroborates Corollary 2. In practice, we can use the upper bound S (N, β) to estimate the security level of B-RAN.
VII. LATENCY-SECURITY TRADE-OFF
From the above analysis, we discover that there exists an inherent relation between latency and security.
This latency-security relationship and design trade-off capture a more complete picture on achievable performance of B-RAN. We formally state this design trade-off as the following theorem. (20) and (25) , respectively. N, β) ). Essentially, the latency-security trade-off is between the convergence rate and confirmation error probability of a distributed system.
Enhancing the security advantage comes at a price of longer access delay, whereas latency reduction comes at a price of security. Theorem 3 provides the achievable region of B-RAN for given network parameters Φ and the attacker's power β. The trade-off provides a more in-depth and complete view of B-RAN than just staring at latency or security.
Theorem 3 also makes another informative statement. If the network condition Φ becomes better, e.g., with less traffic load λ a , then the entire trade-off curve will be shifted to the left along the axis of latency for the same security level. If the attacker becomes more powerful, e.g., a larger β, then the trade-off curve drops in the term of security at the same access delay. Nevertheless, the latency bounds in Section V-B is still application, and can provide an estimation for the achievable performance of B-RAN. is much more sensitive to latency. Therefore, we usually should set a relative smaller N instead of the typical six confirmations suggested in Bitcoin [22] . The specific value of N should be determined by the latency requirement and also the security level.
It is worth noting that the network size can influence the trade-off. Fig. 15 demonstrates that, a more expansive network with more access links s can significantly improve the network performance. Given the security level β and traffic intensity ρ, B-RAN with a larger s has shorter service latency and allows more confirmations. Fig. 15 indicates that, as B-RAN unites more subnetworks, it means more access links s and higher value for B-RAN. This effect corresponds to the well-known positive network effect.
As more subnetworks join B-RAN, they make the B-RAN more valuable and a longer bandwagon.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this study, we established an original framework to analytically characterize B-RAN properties and performances. Based on the established queuing model, we analyzed the system latency of B-RAN and evaluated the security level of B-RAN by considering the risk of alternative history attacks. We uncovered an inherent latency and security relationship. We proposed to assess the achievable performance of B-RAN according to the latency-security trade-off curve. We validated our analytical works by building an in-house B-RAN prototype. The results derived from the model will provide meaningful insights and guidelines for future B-RAN designs and implementations.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. Assume that the mining rates and the difficulty remain constant. The probability of extending honest chain by one block is 1 1+β , and the probability for an attacker to find the next block is β 1+β . Hence, the mining process can be described as a sequence of independent Bernoulli trials with the probability of success Once N blocks are found by the honest network, in a period of time during which Y = n blocks are found by the attacker. A race between honest miners and the attacker begins. As soon as the fraudulent chain becomes longer than the benign chain, the attacker can publish the fraudulent chain to alter a confirmed history. But, if the fraudulent chain is N g (typically greater than N ) blocks behind the benign chain, the attacker would give up. Let P n = Pr {Win|z = n} be the probability that the attacker wins before giving up, when starting from n blocks behind. Obviously, we have P −1 = 1 and P Ng = 0. The derivation of this recursion is simple. If the attacker finds the next block, the fraudulent chain is n − 1 blocks shorter than the benign chain and the probability of a successful attack becomes P n−1 . Similarly, if the benign miners find a block, the attacker is n + 1 blocks behind and the probability of a successful attack becomes P n+1 . Applying the condition on the outcome of the first generated block, we have
Note that (26) comes differently from the equilibrium equations in Section IV. We further rewrite (26) as P n−1 − P n = 1 β (P n − P n+1 ) , 0 ≤ n < N g .
For n = N g − 1, we have P Ng−2 − P Ng−1 = 1 β P Ng−1 − P Ng = 1 β P Ng−1 , which, via recursive, yields P Ng−n−1 − P Ng −n = 1 β n P Ng−1 , 0 ≤ n < N g . We thus obtain the expression of P n as: 
We can arrange the terms in (29) by using the fact 
B. Proof of Corollary 2
Proof. The monotonicity of N g can be easily obtained by observing the expression of S (N, β, N g ). As As a direct result, we easily obtain S (N, β) = lim Ng→∞ S (N, β, N g ) in the limiting case from (24) .
